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CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE FINANCE
HUGH L. SOWARDS*
THE SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY
P was the sole owner of all the shares of stock in X corporation, whose
assets consisted principally of intangible property. In 1959, X corporation
filed an intangible property tax return which listed the intangibles owned
by it at a stated value. X paid its 1959 intangible tax. For the same taxable
year P filed his personal intangible tax return, but did not include for tax
purposes the stock he owned in X corporation. In upholding the imposi-
tion of the tax with respect to P, the court refused to disregard the separate
corporate entity.'
The case is one of first impression in Florida. Cases in other juris-
dictions have split on the point.2 In arguing that the court should disregard
the corporate entity, P took the position that the "double" imposition of
the tax would contravene Florida constitutional and statutory provisions
prohibiting an intangible tax rate in excess of two mills.3 The court's
refusal to consider P, the sole stockholder in X corporation, as the owner
of the property of X corporation, was based partially upon the reasoning
that "the value of appellant's corporate stock . . . bears no necessary rela-
tionship to the value of the intangible property owned by the corporation
itself. The value of corporate intangibles may be substantial, but because
of the manner in which the corporation conducts its affairs its liabilities
might possibly exceed its assets to such an extent as to render it insolvent."
4
The case is in line with the modern trend of authority to the effect that,
under certain circumstances the corporation is regarded as having a person-
ality all of its own as a fictitious person, and that taxation presents one
of these circumstances.
In another case 5 dealing with the nature of the corporate entity, a
corporation was wholly owned by a husband and wife, parties to a divorce
action. Had the chancellor awarded the wife her separate corporate interest,
she would have become a minority stockholder in a hostile situation. Ac-
*Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Marks v. Green, 122 So.2d 491 (Fla. App. 1960).
2. Accord, Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19 (1930); People v.
Commissioners, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 244 (1866); Commissioner v. Moline Properties, Inc..
131 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1942); contra, Inhabitants of E. Livermore v. Livermore Falls
Trust & Banking Co., 103 Me. 418, 69 Atl. 306 (1907).
3. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-399, § 1(2), at 920 (now FLA.
STAT. § 199.11(2) (1961)).
4. Marks v. Green, 122 So.2d 491, 493 (Fla. App. 1960).
5. Turk v. Turk, 118 So.2d 67 (Fla. App. 1960).
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cordingly, the chancellor ordered liquidation of the wife's interest in the
corporation by requiring the husband to purchase that interest. The liquida-
tion and purchase were effected by disregarding the corporate entity and
requiring the corporation to sign a secured note which the husband was
directed to give to his wife for the purchase price of her stock. The
chancellor's action was upheld on appeal.6
SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS
Voting - Outsiders
P corporation made an offer to merge with D corporation, an insurance
company. D corporation then solicited proxies favoring the proposed merger.
Prior to the shareholders' meeting, however, the insurance commissioner
placed certain qualifications on D corporation's continuance in business.
At the shareholders' meeting the proxies were voted for the merger; however,
the proposal nbw included the insurance commissioner's qualifications.
These qualifications were conditions precedent imposed on the P corpora-
tion and had to be performed before D corporation was bound by the
agreement. P corporation never complied with these conditions. Subse-
quently, C corporation made an offer to purchase the business of D corpora-
tion; this offer was accepted. P corporation then brought an action for
specific performance, alleging that the proxies were improperly voted at the
shareholders' meeting of D corporation, because the proposal contained
qualifications not present when the proxies were solicited.7
In granting judgment for D corporation, the court adhered to the
well recognized principle that third persons cannot complain of corporate
action taken at a stockholders' meeting, on the ground of irregularities or
other formal defects in the meeting, at least when this action affects only
the conduct of the corporation within the scope of its charter powers.8 In
the instant case the plaintiff was not in privity with any of the shareholders
of D corporation and therefore had no standing to complain of the manner
in which the proxies were voted; the proper parties to complain were the
stockholders who gave the proxies.
Pre-emptive Rights
The corporate code grants pre-emptive rights to shareholders unless
those rights are expressly denied by the certificate of incorporation. 9 How-
ever, the issuance of shares to which the rights attach must be "for cash."
6. See also Kay v. Key West Dev. Co., 72 So.2d 786 (1954); 1 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 46 (rev. perm. ed. 1931).
7. Abbey Properties Co. v. Presidential Ins. Co., 119 So.2d 74 (Fla. App. 1960).
8. See Annot., 51 A.L.R. 941 (1927).
9. FLA. STAT. § 608.42(2) (1961).
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In Curtis v. Briscoe,'0 stock was issuecd in consideration for services to be
rendered. The court properly held that complaining shareholders were not
entitled to pre-emptive rights. It should be pointed out, however, that
apart from the doctrine of pre-emptive rights, even a non-cash issuance of
shares is subject to cancellation in equity if tainted with fraud. 1 In the
instant case the court indicated its awareness of this equitable relief by
granting the plaintiff time within which to file an amended complaint
clearly alleging fraudulent activity.
LIABILITIES AND LOYALTIES OF CORPORATE OFFICIALS
Corporate officials occupy a fiduciary relationship toward their cor-
porations. Is there a similar fiduciary relationship between corporate officials
and individual shareholders? Authorities are in conflict on this point. The
older view answered the question in the negative, in the absence of deliberate
active deception on the part of the corporate official. This answer pro-
ceeded from the premise that individual rather than corporate business was
involved. Thus, the corporate official could trade freely at arms length
with individual shareholders. Newer cases, however, have viewed the situa-
tion in a more realistic light. In short, the corporate official must disclose
all material facts to the prospective shareholder-seller or purchaser of shares.
Added impetus to this newer doctrine has been given by Rule lOb-5' 2 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'1 This rule is applicable when any
person engages in fraudulent practices, makes misstatements or fails to tell
the whole truth in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. 14
In view of this trend, the result in the recent case of Rogers v. Riddle'
is somewhat surprising. R, the president, director and general manager
of Riddle Airlines, possessed knowledge as an insider that a wealthy investor
was on the point of buying into the company. After conference with this
investor, Riddle called other shareholders and bought their shares without
disclosing his inside information. The court refused to grant rescission of the
sales based upon the chancellor's findings of insufficient evidence to estab-
lish fraud. There was a strong dissenting opinion, on the ground that the
majority's holding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
"What was proved was ample for rescission."1"
10. 129 So.2d 450 (Fla. App. 1961).
11. See Rowland v. Times Pub. Co., 160 Fla. 465, 35 So.2d 399 (1948).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
13. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958).
14. The rule is applicable only when the mails or facilities of interstate commerce
are used to effect the transaction. For an innovation on the application of the rule see
In the matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 6668 (Nov.
8, 1961).
15. 128 So.2d 409 (Fla. App. 1961).
16. Id. at 414. See also Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959)
which involved a similar transaction. The court stated that the president and general
manager of the company owed a fiduciary duty to a stockholder from whom he had
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With respect to liabilities of corporate officials, the corporate code
imposes personal liability if those officials transfer any corporate property
when the corporation is insolvent, with the intent of giving a preference to
any particular creditor over other creditors of the corporation. 17 In a recent
case, "' the president and controlling shareholder of a corporation used cor-
porate funds for the benefit of another corporation in which he had an
interest, receiving in return a conveyance of land to himself. The secretary
of the corporation signed documents necessary to effect the transaction.
This activity took place at a time when the corporation could not meet
its current obligations.
In holding the president personally liable, the court first took the
position that "insolvency" as used in section 608.5519 of the Florida Statutes
means a general inability to answer in the course of business the liabilities
existing and capable of being enforced, rather than an excess of liabilities
over assets.20  Once this test of insolvency was adopted, the president's
conduct obviously fell within the statutory prohibition and was "with the
intent of giving a preference. "21 Inasmuch as there was no showing that
the secretary knew that the transfer was a preference or participated in it
except by signing as secretary at the president's direction, no personal liability
was imposed on him.
TRANSFER OF SHARES
In a well reasoned opinion 22 involving the Uniform Stock Transfer Law, 23
the court was called upon to distinguish between rights accruing to innocent
purchasers and those as between transferor and transferee. P paid D
15,000 dollars for R corporation stock. D assigned this stock to P by a
separate instrument and gave P a power of attorney to transfer it. At this
time D had not yet received his stock certificates, but had a letter from R
corporation advising him that the shares were set aside for him on R's books
and records. Subsequently, dividends were declared by R corporation on
four separate occasions; D paid these dividends to P. Still later, R corpora-
tion went into reorganization under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.2 4
P then brought an unsuccessful action to cancel the sale.
purchased stock of the company, to disclose to the latter the knowledge he had as an
.insider which would affect the value of the stock.
17. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1961).
18. Villiams v. American Crafts, Inc., 129 So.2d 165 (Fla. App. 1961). See also
Levine v. Johnson, 287 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1961).
19. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1961).
20, See also Brown Packing Co. v. Lewis, 185 Misc. 445, 58 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Rett, When is a Corporation Insolvent?, 30 Mic. L. REV. 1040 (1932).
21. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1961).
22, Smallwood v. Moretti, 128 So.2d 628 (Fla. App. 1961).
23. FLA. STAT. ch. 614 (1961).
24. 52 Stat. 833 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958).
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Section 614.03(1)21 of the Florida Statutes permits the transfer of stock
certificates only if there is delivery of the certificates. Furthermore, an
opinion of the Attorney General 20 stated that the Uniform Stock Transfer
Law contemplates delivery of stock certificates as essential to the transfer
of legal title to corporate stock. But the court observed that the section in
question and the Attorney General's opinion were concerned with the pro-
tection of innocent purchasers, creditors and others similarly situated, rather
than with the rights between regular transferors and transferees. The latter
situation, the court pointed out, is governed by another section of the statute
which provides that attempted transfers of title to stock certificates without
delivery "shall have the effect of a promise to transfer and the obligation,
if any, imposed by such promise shall be determined by the law governing
the formation and performance of contracts." 27  Stated another way, an
attempted transfer, such as the one in the instant case, causes the equitable
title to pass to the transferee with an implied promise to transfer legal title
to him, enforceable in accordance with the law of contracts. The decision
is in accord with those in other jurisdictions.28
In Young v. Edwards,29 Y brought an action for specific performance
of a first refusal agreement to purchase corporate stock. The agreement
provided that in the event E at any time within five years "decides to sell
his Class B stock . . . [Y] shall have the first refusal to buy such stock,
paying therefor an amount equal to any bona fide offer to purchase which
[E] may have received .... ",0
While this agreement was in effect, E entered into an option contract
with B, under which B had an option, commencing after expiration of the
E-Y agreement to buy E's stock at one dollar per share. The option contract
contained other conditions. In granting judgment for E, the court reasoned
that E's option grant was not unconditional and therefore not a "decision
to sell" on E's part which would have activated Y's first refusal privilege.
The court was careful to point out that "if . . . [E] has made an uncondi-
tional offer to . . . [B] to sell . . . doubtless . . . [Y's] rights of first refusal
would have been activated .... "81
DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION
Does corporate dissolution necessarily call for a sale of the corporate
assets? Section 608.29(4) 32 of the Florida Statutes provides that in the
event of dissolution final distribution of assets shall be made "in such man-
25. FLA. STAT. § 614.03(1) (1961).
26. 1959-1960] FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 579, 581.
27. FLA. STAT. § 614.12 (1961).
28. See cases cited 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 10 (1922, Supp. 1961).
29. 122 So.2d 211 (Fla. App. 1960).
30. Id. at 212.
31. Id. at 215.
32. FLA. STAT. § 608.29(4) (1961).
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ner as the court may determine . .. ." In Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil
Co.,33 C corporation was dissolved by operation of law for failure to pay
capital stock taxes. There were no creditors. C corporation's assets, con-
sisting of a fractional interest in a mineral base contract and an oil explora-
tion contract, were divisible and distributable in kind. Over the objection
of minority shareholders, the chancellor ordered a sale of the corporate
assets at public auction. This method of liquidation resulted in a distribu-
tion in cash rather than in kind. Furthermore, this sale placed the minority
shareholders in the unenviable position of being forced either to buy out the
majority, or accept the value set by the majority.
The court correctly held that inasmuch as there were no corporate
creditors and no necessity for a sale at public auction, the assets should
have been distributed in kind among the stockholders according to their
respective interests. The point is that section 608.29(4)34 of the Florida
Statutes conferring power on the court to order final distribution of assets
"within . . . such manner as the court may determine," does not give the
court an unbridled discretion. Rather, this discretion "must be exercised
with due regard to the nature of the assets, the circumstances of the parties
and the effect on the rights and interests of the distributees."3
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Corporate Code
A significant amendment to the corporate code provides for the reserva-
tion of a corporate name for a proposed corporation.36 Prior to this amend-
ment, corporate names were granted on a "first-come, first-served" basis.
The attorney who had obtained clearance for the use of a name with the
Secretary of State had no assurance that this name would not be legally
appropriated prior to completion of his incorporation. In certain other
states, however, where the governing statutes permit the reservation of cor-
porate names for an unlimited period of time, the practice of reserving
numerous names with the hope of selling them created an untenable situa-
tion. In enacting the amendment in question, the Florida Legislature
wisely limited the reservation period to fifteen days plus an additional
fifteen day renewal period in the discretion of the Secretary of State.
Florida Securities Act
The Florida Securities Act37 provides for certain exempt securities which
33. 116 So.2d 663 (Fla. App. 1959).
34. FLA. STAT. § 608.29(4) (1961).
35. Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 116 So.2d 663, 669 (Fla. App. 1959).
36. FLA. STAT. § 608.031 (1961).
37. FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1961).
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may be sold without registration.38 One long-time exempted security was
short-term paper, such as negotiable promissory notes maturing in not more
than twelve months from the date of issue. But in the late 1950's, as securi-
ties prices advanced and the public came into the market on a gigantic
scale, the practice grew on the part of unscrupulous persons of offering a
fifteen per cent return on short-term paper, often "secured" by a lien on
worthless or near-worthless realty or personal property. Of course, in order
to pay a fifteen per cent return, the issuer of this paper would have to earn
as high as twenty-five per cent on the invested funds. Needless to say, the
perpetrators of these schemes frequently folded their tents and crept away,
leaving the "investor" holding the bag. In 1959, a much needed amend-
ment"3 to section 517.05(9) of the Florida Statutes exempted short-term
paper only if the maximum yield did not exceed eight per cent and the
paper was not secured by a lien on real or tangible personal property. Osten-
sibly this amendment cured the mischief previously discussed. Therefore
it is difficult to understand why the Florida Legislature, at its 1961 session,
repealed this section, thus eliminating short-term paper altogether from the
list of exempt securities.40  It is submitted that this action may unduly
hamper legitimate business enterprises in their efforts to obtain public funds.
Even if the security in question is not exempt from the registration
provisions of the act, the transaction in which that security is sold may
be exempt. By way of illustration, section 517.06(5)41 of the Florida
Statutes exempts sales to certain classes of sophisticated investors such as
banks, insurance companies, and securities brokers and dealers. However,
trusts and pension plans were not included. A 1961 amendment to this
section 42 now includes sales to these investors as exempt transactions.
An additional exempt transaction under the act concerned bonds or
notes secured by mortgages upon real estate or tangible personal property
when the entire mortgage, together with all of the bonds or notes secured
thereby, were sold to a single purchaser at a single sale.43  Recently, how-
ever, dangerous practices arose with respect to "guarantees" and "insurance"
features concerning the issuance of these securities. A 1961 amendment 44
provides that bonds or notes cannot be sold in an exempt transaction if
they contain an express recourse agreement or guarantee as to repayment
38. FLA. STAT. § 517.05 (1961).
39. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-256, § 1, at 905.
40. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-78. Also at its 1961 session, the Florida Legislature en-
larged the exemption for securities of agricultural cooperatives by exempting sales of such
securities if the cooperative in question operates wholly within the borders of Florida(formerly, a "single county") and if all of its stockholders are Florida residents (formerly,
"residents of such county"). Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-103 (FLA. STAT. § 517.05(10)
(1961)).
41. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(5) (1961).
42. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-405.
43. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(7) (1961).
44. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-455.
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of principal or interest. In addition, bonds or notes are exempt "if they
are fully insured by an insurance company authorized to do business in
this state under chapter 635, Florida Statutes, or insured or guaranteed by
an agency of the federal government. '45
The Florida Securities Act 46 regulates not only the sale of securities
but those persons who sell them - brokers and dealers. A 1961 amend-
ment 47 now makes it clear that one who holds both a security dealer's license
and a life insurance license is subject to the act when he offers to prospective
purchasers a life insurance "investment plan" such as a mutual fund pro-
gram. The new amendment provides for revocation of his security dealer's
or salesman's license unless he prepares and leaves with each prospective
buyer a written and signed proposal, on or before delivery of any investment
plan.
Professional Service Corporation Act
At its 1961 session, the Florida Legislature authorized the creation of
professional service corporations, providing for the incorporation of an
individual or group of individuals to render the same type of professional
services to the public as are now rendered by unincorporated persons or
groups A8 These professional services include those of attorneys, accountants,
doctors, dentists, chiropodists, podiatrists, architects, veterinarians and life
insurance agents. This new piece of legislation is the subject of detailed
treatment in a recent article in the University of Miami Law Review.49
45. Ibid.
46. FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1961).
47. Fla. Laws 1961, eh. 61-448 (FLA. STAT. § 517.16(10) (a) (1961)).
48. FLA. STAT. eb. 621 (1961). See also, In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133
So.2d 554 (1961).
49. Buchmann & Bearden, The Professional Service Corporation-A New Business
Entity, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1961).
